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Abstract This study applies the institution-based view and neo-institutional theory 
in addressing how managerial perceptions of regulator vulnerabilities to political pres-
sure, and institutional distance, influence intensification of political ties. Our analysis of 
181 wholly owned foreign subsidiary (WOFSs) operating in the Philippines suggests 
that managerial perceptions of regulator vulnerability to political pressures positively 
enhance the intensification of political ties. Our results also reveal that regulatory dis-
tance and, more importantly, the simultaneous presence of political and regulatory dis-
tance diminish the positive relationship between managerial perceptions of regulator vul-
nerability to political pressures and a WOFS’s propensity to enhance the intensification 
of political ties. Managerial implications and future research directions are discussed.
Keywords Political tie intensity · Political pressure · Government interference · 
Regulatory distance · Political distance · Institution-based view · Neo-institutional 
theory
1 Introduction
Uncertain regulatory environments represent a key source of concern for wholly 
owned foreign subsidiaries (WOFSs) since they often inefficiently govern and 
constrain critical transactions, resources and opportunities in a host country (Luo 
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and Peng 1999; Peng and Heath 1996; Puck et al. 2013). WOFSs can be seriously 
affected by uncertain host-country regulatory environments as they are often subject 
to unpredictable policy shifts and inconsistent quality of administrative enforcement 
(Hoskisson et  al. 2000; Kingsley et  al. 2012; Luo 2004, 2007). For example, for-
mal regulatory constraints in a host country may “change overnight as the result of 
political and judicial decisions” (Peng and Heath 1996, p. 504). Consequently, gov-
ernment interference will often force inexperienced, ill-equipped, and ill-informed 
public administrators to erratically enforce regulatory policies (Bevan et  al. 2004; 
Folsom et al. 2002; Luo 2002; Meyer 2001). These policy shifts have serious conse-
quences for WOFSs because laws and regulations established by a host government 
affect transactions within a specific market (Kobrin 1978; Rodriguez et al. 2005) due 
to their shaping the formal rules that determine the reward structures and character 
of commercial activity (North 1997; Rosenzweig and Singh 1991).
Past research has generally revealed that government interference through the 
regulation of WOFSs creates the risk of government property expropriation (Kob-
rin 1978), the repudiation of property contracts (Delios and Henisz 2003; Henisz 
2000a, b, 2004), the limitation of licensing and/or company ownership (Davidow 
1980), and/or the imposition of capital controls (Shen and Lin 2012). Therefore, 
government interference manifested through laws, regulatory policies and admin-
istrative rules enforced by civil servants in regulatory agencies can cause market 
imperfections that negatively influence and impede WOFS operations in a foreign 
market (Brewer 1993).
Due to such unstable operating environments, several researchers have suggested 
that WOFSs will be substantially motivated to find ways of strategically minimiz-
ing the influence of host-country regulatory and political uncertainty—for example, 
through the intensification of political ties with regulators—in order to safeguard 
investments and operations (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994; Lawton et  al. 2012a, 
2012; Sun et al. 2012; White et al. 2015). However, the intensification of political 
ties may benefit WOFSs if their target—namely government regulators—exhibit 
vulnerabilities to political pressure. Further, previous research has revealed that 
political distance (Malik 2013) and regulatory distance (Gaur and Lu 2007) have 
moderating effects concerning the handling of regulatory hazards by foreign sub-
sidiaries.1 Moreover, when WOFS’ home and host countries differ significantly in 
terms of political and regulatory institutions, these foreign subsidiaries will experi-
ence greater difficulties in intensifying political ties with host-country government 
actors in order to mitigate government interference manifested through regulatory 
enforcement (Henisz and Zelner 2005).
Therefore, we argue that political and regulatory distances will cause WOFSs 
to be less capable of leveraging institutional similarities between home and host 
country political and regulatory institutions when WOFSs intensify political ties. 
However, research has yet to empirically investigate how political and regulatory 
1 Distance between political institutions concerns differences in politically-motivated instability con-
cerning public policy standards (Malik 2013); while distance between regulatory institutions concerns 
differences in monitoring rules and laws through sanctioning by legal and administrative bodies in order 
to enforce prescribed behavior (Xu and Shenkar 2002).
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distances between a WOFS’s home and host country will influence the relation-
ship between managerial perceptions of regulator vulnerabilities2 to political pres-
sure and the ability of WOFSs to intensify political ties. Hence we ask the following 
research questions: (1) How will managerial perceptions of regulator vulnerability 
to political pressure influence a WOFS’s propensity to develop political ties, and (2) 
how will political and regulatory distances between a WOFS’ home and host coun-
try moderate the relationship between managerial perceptions of regulator vulner-
abilities to political pressure and the intensification of political ties?
For this purpose, we apply the institution-based view to better understand how 
foreign-subsidiary strategies are influenced by managerial perceptions of the insti-
tutional environment (Peng 2002). The institution-based view suggests that “insti-
tutional frameworks signal to managers […] which strategic decisions are suitable 
in a host country” and that these “strategic decisions concern ‘rational choices’ that 
managers may or may not exercise in order to mitigate adverse effects associated 
with formal institutions” (White et  al. 2015, p. 343; Peng et  al. 2009). Thus, we 
suggest that increasing the intensity of political ties with key government actors in 
the nonmarket arena represents an attempt to proactively mitigate the uncertainty 
associated with perceived regulator vulnerability to political pressure. It is our con-
tention that enhanced intensity of political ties with key government actors will 
serve as a nonmarket strategic attempt to influence the regulatory oversight process 
(Bonardi et  al. 2005; Oliver and Holzinger 2008), thereby creating opportunities 
for the WOFS to proactively shape how it is regulated (Bonardi 1999). However, 
we also apply neo-institutional theory (Scott 1995) in suggesting that political dis-
tance (Malik 2013) and regulatory distance (Gaur and Lu 2007) will have moderat-
ing effects on regulatory hazards, negatively influencing a WOFS’ ability to identify 
regulators vulnerable to political pressure and diminishing a WOFS’ capability of 
leveraging regulatory and political similarities between home and host countries to 
enhance the intensity of political ties.
With this in mind, recent reviews of the CPA literature concludes that firm gov-
ernance, as one of the identified less examined CPA antecedents, is especially in 
need of further theoretical development and empirical research. For example, Lux 
et al. (2011, p. 240, 242) review of the corporate political activity (CPA) literature 
has stated that “of the less examined CPA antecedents […] firm governance is one 
antecedent that especially requires theoretical development and empirical investiga-
tion” and “institutional theory is not yet a central theory guiding CPA inquiry […]” 
(see also Doh et al. 2012). CPA scholars have also observed that strategic choices 
often differ markedly but little is known about the role of managerial cognition 
concerning strategic decision-making, particularly how management’s leader-
ship, motives, judgement, and choices influence their firm’s proactive nonmarket 
2 We define regulator vulnerabilities as (1) public (civil) service vulnerability to political pressure, (2) 
independence of public (civil) service from government interference, and (3) strength and expertise of 
the civil service to avoid interruptions during times of instability.
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strategies (Mellahi et  al. 2016). These observations are of particular salience for 
CPA scholars conducting international management research in that an “up-and-
coming challenge for CPA scholars is to understand non-market activity in emerging 
economies […]” (Lawton et al. 2012, p. 14) yet the reliance by scholars “on second-
ary data and perceived difficulty in collecting primary data also likely contribute to 
the lack of stronger support for current theoretical perspectives” (Lux et al. 2011, p. 
241).
Our study sets-out to answer these calls by filling important gaps in the CPA lit-
erature through the application of both the institution-based view and neo-institu-
tional theory in exploring the relationship between (a) managerial perceptions of 
regulator vulnerabilities to political pressures in the regulatory oversight process 
and (b) WOFS intensification of political ties in a host country’s operating environ-
ment. Second, we also contribute to the CPA literature by considering how mana-
gerial perceptions of regulator vulnerabilities to political pressures and institutional 
(political and regulatory) distance affects WOFS intensification of political ties in 
an emerging market environment. Our findings suggest that: (1) Perceived regula-
tor vulnerability to government interference will influence a WOFS’s propensity to 
develop political ties, (2) regulatory distance negatively moderates the relationship 
between perceived regulator vulnerability to political pressures and the intensifica-
tion of political ties, and (3) the simultaneous, and moderating, impact of both politi-
cal and regulatory distances will further diminish the relationship between perceived 
political pressures and the intensification of political ties. Third, we contribute to the 
CPA literature by testing our hypotheses via unique survey data gathered from the 
rarely explored context of the Philippines.
Our study is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the theoretical 
foundations and hypotheses of our study. We then empirically assess our theory and 
model. Subsequently, we summarize the study’s results. Finally, we conclude with 
a discussion of the study’s results, limitations, and implications for future research.
2  Theory Development and Hypotheses
2.1  Regulator Vulnerability to Political Pressures
Government regulation is imposed to address market imperfections or failures in 
order to benefit the economy and the general public within a society. However, some 
governments are less independent than others as when, for instance, they become 
beholden to powerful interests that want administrative rules written to benefit pri-
vate interests through government regulatory interference acquired through rent-
seeking activities (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; Posner 1974). When government 
regulators are independent and there is a lack of government interference, there will 
be an improvement in overall market competition on account of the lack of regula-
tory bias in favor of powerful interests such as incumbent firms and state-owned 
enterprises.
However, host-country governments frequently make long-term regulatory pol-
icy commitments, only to later renege on their commitments and expropriate rents 
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generated by foreign subsidiaries (Chung and Beamish 2005; Luo 2003). These 
indeterminate public policy shifts fashioned by high-level government officials and 
enforced through lower-level civil servants are often designed to extract rents from 
foreign subsidiaries operating in their sphere of influence (Djankov et  al. 2003; 
Heidenreich et  al. 2015). This approach has been termed the ‘tollbooth theory of 
regulation’ which posits that the regulation of foreign entities is largely pursued for 
the benefit of high-ranking politicians and bureaucrats through bribery and extor-
tion, thereby serving no real social purpose. However, a host government may pro-
vide a consistent set of regulatory policies and administrative rules that is crucial 
for the viability of a WOFS (Luo 2004). With this notion in mind, nonmarket strat-
egy research has established that developing political resources through ties with 
government officials provides opportunities for strategically influencing and thereby 
shaping regulatory policies (Hillman et  al. 2004). Consequently, Lawton et  al. 
(2012, p. 6) argued that “[d]eveloping political resources in specific policy settings 
implies that the impact of a policy will be unequal across different firms” thereby 
causing these firms to develop “different responses to expectations […] in political 
situations […]”
Therefore, drawing from the CPA literature and applying the institution-based 
view (Meyer et al. 2009; Peng 2002; Peng et al. 2008), we posit that WOFS mana-
gerial perceptions of regulator vulnerabilities to political pressures associated with 
government interference are a primary strategic determinant in the decision to 
intensify political ties. These strategic responses will prompt WOFS’ to intensify 
engagement with key government actors as intermediaries in changing the nature 
of their firms’ regulatory environment (Holburn and Zelner 2010; Hoskisson et al. 
2000; Oliver 1997). For example, Zhou and Peng (2010) have suggested that firms 
must take into account the combination of monitoring costs and problems concern-
ing ineffective enforcement by a regulatory regime when protecting resources from 
appropriation hazards. Zhou and Poppo (2010) also found that managers who per-
ceived the regulatory environment as being non-credible (i.e., as being arbitrary in 
nature) were more likely to utilize informal relationships when trying to safeguard 
assets in a host country environment.
Hence, we argue that the managers of WOFSs that perceive regulatory actors to 
be vulnerable to political pressures will attempt to intensify political ties and other 
rent-seeking activities with key government actors as a strategic response to circum-
vent the threat of erratic regulatory policy shifts. These WOFSs will engage in and 
benefit from rent-seeking activities by influencing the regulatory process through 
the intensification of political ties (Sun et al. 2010; White et al. 2015). Through this 
intensification of political ties, management will create deeply embedded relation-
ships with key government actors who can grant privileged treatment to WOFSs 
by regulators vulnerable to high levels of political pressures and government med-
dling (Li et  al. 2008; Sun et  al. 2010). Further, there will be practical nonmarket 
benefits associated with the intensification of political ties since “most rules and 
regulations are ambiguous and their enforcement is subject to the personal inter-
pretations of government officials” (Park and Luo 2001, p. 465). Therefore, these 
strategic responses in nonmarket political space will offer an WOFS the opportunity 
to influence the regulatory oversight process (Bonardi et  al. 2005; Kingsley et  al. 
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2012; Oliver and Holzinger 2008), thereby creating opportunities for the WOFS to 
proactively shape how their subsidiary is regulated and thereby mitigate uncertainty 
associated with regulator vulnerabilities to political pressure. Hence, we therefore 
propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: WOFSs that perceive regulator vulnerabilities to political pres-
sures as high will intensify political ties.
2.2  Moderating Effects of Political and Regulatory Distances
Following neo-institutional theory research, we define regulatory and political dis-
tance as the extent or difference between the political and regulatory institutions 
of home and host countries (Gaur and Lu 2007; Pogrebnyakov and Maitland 2011; 
Scott 1995; Xu et al. 2004). On one hand, political institutions impose public pol-
icy standards set through consensus building activities in a nonmarket environment 
(Boddewyn 1988; Malik 2013). Differences in the level of politically-motivated 
instability concerning public policy standards can have a tremendous impact on a 
WOFS’ ability to predict political behavior and to “[push public] policies towards 
their preferred points” (Bonardi 1999, p. 165; Bonardi et al. 2005; Kobrin 1978). On 
the other hand, regulatory institutions monitor rules and laws by imposing report-
ing requirements and sanctions in order to enforce prescribed behavior (White et al. 
2015; Xu et al. 2004; Xu and Shenkar 2002). Thus, differences in home and host 
country regulatory contexts may influence a WOFS’s understanding concerning 
“the extent of laws protecting investors’ rights  […] the efficiency and integrity of 
a country’s judicial system, [and] the tradition of law and order” (Landi 2011, p. 
91) that “determines the extent to which economic transactions between [or among] 
organizations are [formally] governed” (Fainshmidt et al. 2014, p. 190). For exam-
ple, Luo and Zhao (2013, p. 7) have argued that “in the presence of large regulatory 
distance, MNC subsidiaries will perceive greater deterrence and higher transaction 
costs escalated by […] regulations” enforced by legal bodies that, “from an institu-
tional perspective, elevates environmental impediments and increases information 
search costs”.
In general, neo-institutional theory suggests that environmental familiarity will 
result in competitive advantages for WOFSs whose institutional distance is less (Luo 
and Zhao 2013). This is because “MNEs embedded within different institutional 
contexts develop distinct logical frameworks in order to overcome uncertainty and 
gain legitimacy” (Fainshmidt et al. 2014, p. 190). For example, WOFSs must adapt 
operations to “differences in laws, regulations, [public] policies, [and] enforce-
ments […] that promote certain types of […] strategic behavior” (Chao et al. 2012, 
pp. 671–672). This adaptation can be problematic for WOFSs with parent compa-
nies from very different regulatory and political environments, in that their ability to 
counteract institutional isomorphic pressures for the purpose of achieving external 
legitimacy in the host country will be more difficult and costly (Chao and Kumar 
2010; Xu et al. 2004).
Therefore, unfamiliarity hazards generated by differences between operating 
environments will increase the costs associated with WOFS’ abilities to align norms 
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with host country institutions, thereby influencing their strategic choices and prac-
tices (Kostova and Zaheer 1999; Yiu and Makino 2002). It is therefore argued that 
WOFSs with parents from home countries with more distant political and regulatory 
environments will be less capable of leveraging institutional similarities (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc 2008). Consequently, these WOFSs will possess disadvantages 
associated with increased environmental impediments and increased information 
search costs due to a lack of political and regulatory similarities (Luo and Zhao 
2013). These search costs and institutional impediments will make it more difficult 
for WOFSs from politically and regulatory distant environments to recognize when 
the government is intervening in the regulatory oversight process and applying polit-
ical pressure in a host country’s civil service administration.
On the other hand, it is likely that WOFSs from less distant political and regula-
tory institutional environments will have a greater ability to identify when political 
pressures are being placed on civil servants regulating the daily operations of their 
subsidiary. Therefore, when these WOFS’ identify the presence of political interfer-
ence (or government meddling) associated with enhanced political pressures placed 
on civil servants, they will have a heightened proclivity to exploit their competi-
tive advantages associated with political and regulatory familiarities by intensifying 
political ties with key actors in government agencies. We therefore suggest the fol-
lowing hypotheses:
Hypotheses 2a–2b: The positive relationship between the intensification of 
political ties and perceived regulator vulnerabilities to political pressures will 
be weaker when (a) political distance and (b) regulatory distance between a 
WOFS’s home and host country is high rather than low.
Beyond their individual moderating effects, the confluence of political distance 
and regulatory distance will likely have additional effects on the relationships 
between WOFS perceptions regarding regulator vulnerabilities to (1) political pres-
sures and (2) the intensification of political ties. First, as suggested in hypothesis 2a, 
when political distance is high, a WOFS will have less understanding of the formula-
tion and configuration of public policies in a host country institutional environment 
(Malik 2013). Holburn and Zelner (2010) suggested that this is because “in the polit-
ical realm, the knowledge that firms develop about how the policy-making process 
operates when governed by a particular institutional configuration can [more easily] 
be applied to other countries with similar institutional configurations […]”. Second, 
as suggested in hypothesis 2b, when regulatory distance is high, an understanding 
of how the monitoring and enforcement of laws and rules increases environmental 
barriers, including enhanced impediments such as information search costs (Luo and 
Zhao 2013; Pogrebnyakov and Maitland 2011) that make it more difficult for these 
WOFSs to gain external legitimacy (Chao and Kumar 2010). For example, Xu and 
Shenkar (2002) argued that regulatory distance will create uncertainty leading to 
a heightened threshold for firms in learning how legal provisions associated with 
property rights will be enforced by regulators in a host country. As previously noted, 
these unfamiliarity hazards will lead to competitive disadvantages, in that it will be 
much more difficult for WOFSs to leverage nonmarket capabilities when originating 
from more distant political or regulatory institutional environments.
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However, the CPA literature has yet to specifically take into account how the 
interaction of political distance and regulatory distance will effect that perceptions 
of regulatory vulnerability to political pressures have on the intensification of politi-
cal ties by WOFSs. We argue here that, taken together, the interaction between polit-
ical distance and regulatory distance will have mutually reinforcing, complementary 
effects (i.e., effects beyond their individual moderating effects) when present simul-
taneously. In essence, the confounding nature of the interaction between political 
distance and regulatory distance will exacerbate unfamiliarity hazards, making it 
more difficult for these WOFSs to: (1) identify when regulators, as civil servants, are 
susceptible to political pressures (Boddewyn and Brewer 1994; Bonardi and Keim 
2005), and when regulator vulnerabilities to pressures are identified how to (2) align 
nonmarket capabilities with the local institutional environment in order to effec-
tively intensify political ties that can be used to mitigate and strategically exploit 
political pressures for competitive advantages (Holburn and Zelner 2010; Oliver and 
Holzinger 2008).
The heightened nature of these institutional dissimilarities will cause difficul-
ties in identifying opportunities associated with regulator vulnerabilities to politi-
cal pressure and the “leveraging [of] […] institutional advantages arising from envi-
ronmental” familiarities when pursuing the intensification of political ties (Luo and 
Zhao 2013, p. 8), thus making it more difficult for the foreign subsidiary to proac-
tively manage relationships with government regulators in order to mitigate risks 
posed by rapid and erratic regulatory policy shifts. In summary, the interaction 
between political and regulatory distances will further diminish the positive rela-
tionship that perceptions of regulator vulnerabilities to political pressure will have 
on a WOFS’s propensity to intensify political ties with key government actors. Con-
sequently, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The simultaneous presence of high political distance and high 
regulatory distance will further diminish the positive relationship between 
WOFS perceptions of regulator vulnerability to political pressures and the 
intensification of political ties.
3  Methodology
3.1  Sample and Data
This study was conducted on a sample of WOFSs operating in the Philippines. The 
Philippines provides an ideal context for the study of political ties, given its status 
as a typical middle-income country that is negatively impacted by significant cor-
ruption and government inefficiency. While the Philippines attracts significant for-
eign investment, these figures are surpassed by the investment inflows into its South-
east Asian neighbors, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Thus, while its 
Southeast Asian neighbors have experienced significant economic growth despite 
governance issues, this has not been the case for the Philippines (Lim and Stern 
2003). Several international business studies have ascribed the economic difficulties 
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experienced by the Philippines as having been caused by issues relating to institu-
tional quality (Balisacan and Hill 2003; Nye 2011).
The data for this study was obtained through a survey of senior leaders such as 
chief executive officers, managing directors, country managers, vice-presidents, and 
senior managers in charged with managing WOFSs operating in the Philippines. 
Although the use of multiple informants is preferable in such a data collection pro-
cess in our research design, we chose a single senior executive that had primary 
responsibility for the WOFS operation or had a direct reporting relationship with 
the senior executive. Previous management research validates that key informants 
in senior leadership, decision-making, positions offers equally reliable data to that 
obtained from multiple informants or secondary data (Gong et al. 2007; Miller et al. 
1997). These key informants were familiar with the environment within which their 
WOFS operated (Luo 2007); strategies employed by their WOFS; and had access to 
hard data as a point of reference (Julian and Ofori-Dankwa 2008).
The survey questionnaires were designed and implemented according to the tai-
lored design method (Dillman 2000). Measurement items were based on theoretical 
considerations and generated through a review of the relevant international business 
literature. All measurement items used in this study were validated in previously 
published peer reviewed journal articles. The questionnaire was designed and devel-
oped in English, a primary language universally spoken in Philippine business cir-
cles. Moreover, the clarity of the questionnaire items was verified through initial 
interviews and pre-tests with managers operating in the Philippines.
Our survey sample consists of 540 WOFSs selected from the Foreign Compa-
nies in the Philippines Yearbook (2007), compiled and published by the Commer-
cial Intelligence Service of Business Monitor International, London, United King-
dom. The selected sample of WOFSs consists of firms established for a minimum 
of 3  years, since the survey questions referred to the past 3  years as the relevant 
time frame for responses to “avoid capturing biased responses based on particular 
episodes of peak performance or even one-time negative relational experiences” 
(Mesquita and Lazzarini 2008, p. 365). We conducted data collection from August 
through December of 2007 in the Philippines by administering a questionnaire on-
site (through field visits) rather than through the use of archival data or mail sur-
veys (due to the lack of reliable archival data) and because the unreliability of the 
Philippine postal system made the use of these methods extremely difficult. On-site 
data collection methodology also helped gain access to the right informants, ensured 
the correct use and understanding of terminology, and provided the opportunity for 
enhanced response rates (Fang and Zou 2009; Lee and Miller 1999; Li and Zhang 
2007). To solicit maximum participation in the study, telephone calls were made in 
advance to targeted informants at each WOFS explaining the purpose of the study 
and requesting their participation. Immediately after phone calls were made, the 
researcher in charge of managing the data collection process delivered the ques-
tionnaires to key informants and mutually agreed on a date to collect the completed 
questionnaires (see generally Acquaah 2007).
To enhance participation and maximize accurate responses, an attached cover let-
ter explained to potential survey potential informants that (1) they would not have 
to identify themselves when answering the questionnaire, (2) their responses would 
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be kept confidential, and (3) they would receive a summary of the research findings 
upon completion of the study (Lee and Miller 1999; Podsakoff et al. 2003). After 
several follow-up, we received responses from 194 foreign subsidiaries. Other than 
13 questionaires deemed unusable, we concluded our survey collection with a final 
response rate of 33.5% (i.e., 181/540). This response rate was comparable to other 
studies that have performed similar data collection methods (e.g., Acquaah 2007, 
53%; Li and Zhang 2007, 38.6%).3
In order to provide survey result triangulation, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with 15 key informants in order to check the accuracy of their answers 
(Krishnan et al. 2006; Luo 1999). As with Krishnan et al. (2006) and Luo (1999), 
randomly selected key informants were interviewed a second time, several months 
after the initial administration of the survey instrument randomly selected key 
informants were asked to identify, per the original survey instrument, specific 
aspects of their WOFS’s strategic behavior, political ties, and perceptions of the 
Philippine legal system. Using a three-point Likert scale (for parsimony and ease 
of interpretation), we then categorized the solicited responses. The results displayed 
strong consistency between interview and survey answers (Pearson correlations 
were above 0.83, p < 0.01; Guttman split-half Rs were above 0.71).
We also used the Foreign Companies in the Philippines Yearbook (2007) to check 
for non-response bias. From this source we were able to check for non-response bias, 
and were able to compare some attributes WOFSs identified from the code numbers 
written on each questionnaire. Employing an unpaired t-test, the mean difference 
between responding key informants and non-responding key informants with respect 
to the number of employees (size), number of years operating in the Philippines 
(experience), and business sector (manufacturing or service industry) was analyzed. 
The results established that the two groups were not significantly different (p > 0.05 
level). This result was further confirmed by running a logistic regression analysis 
using the same archival variables as predictors with the dependent (dichotomous) 
variable being coded as 1 for responding key informants and 0 for non-responding 
key informants; the regression coefficients did not sizably differ and none of the pre-
dictor variables were significant at the p < 0.05 level.
Of the survey responses, 54% were from chief officers, country managers, 
managing directors, general managers, and executives, while the rest (46%) were 
from senior vice presidents, directors, regional heads, and other senior managers 
with direct reporting relationships to the head of the WOFS. Moreover, regarding 
key informants, 44% were foreign expatriates and 56% were local nationals. The 
sample consisted of a wide array of manufacturing and service industries, includ-
ing electronics and electrical equipment (10.48%), construction and engineering 
(8.29%), chemicals (7.86%), various consultancies (7.42%), trade (7.42%), phar-
maceuticals and medical care (6.98%), machinery and heavy equipment (6.98%), 
and banking/finance/insurance (6.55%). WOFS countries of origin (from high-
est to lowest number) included the USA (49), Japan (45), the U.K. (17), France 
(12), and Germany (10). Regions of origin included the Americas (29.8%), Asia 
3 Due to missing data the sample size for this study = 175.
753
1 3
Regulator Vulnerabilities to Political Pressures and Political…
(33.1%), and Europe (36%). Further, their mean number of employees (size) was 
460.54 and mean number of years (experience) operating in the Philippines was 
29.42 years.
3.2  Variables and Measurement
3.2.1  Dependent Variable
Political tie intensity (Cronbach’s alpha 0.80; communality  loadings 0.87–0.53) 
was measured by four items adapted from White et  al. (2015). This measure 
identifies the “overall level of interaction a WOFS has with government offi-
cials” (White et al. 2015, p. 348). Using the past three years as a reference point, 
respondents were asked to rate their WOFSs informal ties and connections to 
(1) regulatory authorities, (2) political leaders in various levels of government, 
and (3) commercial administration bureaus on a seven-point Likert-type scale 
(1 = ‘very little’ to 7 = ‘very much’). We also included an item that asked sen-
ior managers the extent of time spent dealing with government officials during 
this same time-frame (1 = ‘very low’ to 7 = ‘very high’). We factor analyzed these 
four items via principle component analysis employing varimax rotation.
3.2.2  Predictor Variable
The primary variable of interest in this study is regulator vulnerability to political 
pressure. We developed the regulator vulnerability to political pressure construct 
(hereinafter also ‘regulator vulnerability’) based on theoretical ideas derived 
from several studies in the institutions and nonmarket strategy literatures (Delios 
and Henisz 2003; Luo 2004, 2005, 2007; Peng and Heath 1996; Rosenzweig 
and Singh 1991). Regulator vulnerability (Cronbach’s alpha 0.90; communality 
loadings 0.86–0.83) was employed as the primary variable of interest in order 
to explain how regulator vulnerability to political pressures would influence the 
intensification of political ties by WOFSs. A multi-item measure was created by 
adapting measures taken from Kaufmann et al. (2007). Using the past three years 
as a reference point, informants were asked to rate the extent to which they per-
ceived government regulator vulnerability to be with regard to (1) public (civil) 
service vulnerability to political pressure, (2) independence of public (civil) ser-
vice from government interference, and (3) strength and expertise of the civil ser-
vice to avoid interruptions during times of instability on a seven-point Likert-
type scale (1 = ‘very low’ to 7 = ‘very high’).
3.2.3  Contingency Variables
Political distance and regulator distance were employed as contingency variables 
in this study. Political distance (Malik 2013) assesses the differences in political 
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instability concerning public policy standards set through consensus building activi-
ties in a WOFS’s home and host country (the Philippines). In order to capture differ-
ences in home and host country political stability, we employed the political stability 
and absence of violence indicator from the World Governance Indicators database, 
published by the World Bank. This indicator measures politically-motivated instabil-
ity of government institutions. For each foreign subsidiary we coded the respective 
indicator score (ranging from 0 to 100) based on its country of origin. To ensure 
stability and temporal precedence in our research design, we obtained and averaged 
regulatory quality data for 4 years, with the last one being the year of the survey. 
The political distance between a particular home country and the Philippines was 
then measured as the absolute difference between the two countries’ political stabil-
ity scores.
Regulatory distance (Xu et al. 2004) assesses the differences in monitoring and 
enforcing rules and laws through sanctioning by legal and administrative bodies 
that exist in a WOFS’s home and host country (the Philippines). This multi-item 
construct was adopted from Xu et al. (2004). The items used in this construct were 
originally taken from The Global Competitiveness Report (1997), published by the 
World Economic Forum, which documented country civil system differences using 
over 170 different items. Six items were averaged together by Xu et  al. (2004) in 
order to create a country’s score for its regulative dimension, including (1) how anti-
trust or anti-monopoly policies effectively promote competition; (2) how effective is 
the legal system in enforcing commercial contracts; (3) can private businesses read-
ily file suits at independent and impartial courts if there is a breach of trust on the 
part of the government; (4) can citizens willingly accept legal means to adjudicate 
disputes rather than depending on physical force or illegal means; (5) there is little 
chance that legal and political institutions will drastically change over the next five 
years; and (6) being an important business activity consideration, police are effec-
tive in safeguarding personal security. The regulatory distance between a particu-
lar home country and the Philippines was then measured as the absolute difference 
between the two countries’ regulative scores (taken from Appendix 2a of Xu et al. 
2004, p. 302).
3.2.4  Control Variables
Informant nationality, informant host country experience, cultural distance, WOFS 
experience, WOFS size, market orientation, industry, and perceived competitive 
position were used as control variables. The dummy variable informant nationality 
(coded 1 = Filipino, 0 = otherwise), as identified in the survey, was used as a control 
due to the likelihood that host country local and foreign expatriate respondents may 
differ in their perceptions of their subsidiary’s formulation of strategic practices in 
the nonmarket arena and perceptions of host country regulative institutions, possibly 
biasing the analysis (Luo 2002). Informant host country experience was added to 
the analyses along similar theoretical line. This variable was taken from the sur-
vey instrument and referred to the number of years that a senior executive or man-
ager spent working in the Philippines. We controlled for cultural distance by using 
Kogut and Singh’s (1988) formula which is based on Hofstede’s (1980) four cultural 
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dimensions (individualism, masculinity, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance), 
to compute the distance between the Philippine’s national culture and the national 
culture of the country of origin of each WOFS.
WOFS experience, referring to the number of years the subsidiary had been 
operating (from initial year of establishment) in the Philippines and taken from the 
Foreign Companies in the Philippines Yearbook (2007), was added in the analysis 
since the number of years a foreign subsidiary operates in a host country will play 
a major role in its learning, adapting (or not adopting) to, and strategically position-
ing itself in a host country environment (Li and Zhang 2007). We included WOFS 
size, based on the total number of full-time employees of the subsidiary taken from 
the Foreign Companies in the Philippines Yearbook (2007), because larger WOFSs 
will normally have greater resources and a greater number of formal contractual 
relationships. We then logged WOFS size in order to eliminate potential skewness 
associated with this variable (Ismail et  al. 2013). We controlled for market orien-
tation (Luo 2007) since local market dependence (versus being export oriented) 
should have an effect on contracting propensities of foreign subsidiary operations. 
This measure was obtained from the Foreign Companies in the Philippines Year-
book (2007) and coded 1 = local market focused, 0 = export-oriented.
We controlled for several industry effects by employing dummy variables for 
technology oriented (coded 1 = technology and 0 = otherwise), oil and gas oriented 
(coded 1 = oil and gas, and 0 = otherwise), and banking and finance oriented (indus-
try dummy 2; coded 1 = banking and finance and 0 = otherwise) industries. These 
variables were derived from the Philippine Statistical Yearbook (2007). Finally, we 
added managerial perceptions of competitive position to the analysis as a control 
in determining a WOFS’s satisfaction with qualitative performance. This variable 
is a single item taken from our survey instrument. In using the past three years as 
a reference point respondents were asked to rate how satisfied they were with their 
WOFS’s competitive position on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = ‘very dissatis-
fied’ to 7 = ‘very satisfied’).
4  Data Analysis and Results
4.1  Reliability and Validity
A principal component factor analysis was performed on all key survey items to 
determine their construct validity, dimensionality, internal consistency, and item 
appropriateness. All item loadings for the multi-item constructs were significantly 
related to their underlying factor and were well above the cut-off point of 0.45 (rang-
ing from 0.84 to 0.75) (Hair et al. 1998). Also, all constructs displayed high levels of 
reliability, as indicated by Cronbach’s alphas ranging from 0.90 to 0.80 (Hair et al. 
1998).
The majority of data used in this study was derived from survey instruments 
questioning single key informants holding leadership positions in WOFSs. There-
fore, we used several procedural and statistical remedies outlined in Podsakoff et al. 
(2003) and Chang et al. (2010), and implemented in studies using similar methods 
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(Krishnan et  al. 2006; Li and Zhang 2007; Peng and Luo 2000) to minimize and 
control for potential common method bias and single informant bias. Specifically, 
we undertook the procedural remedies of protecting informant anonymity, reducing 
item ambiguity, separating scale items for the dependant variables and predictor var-
iables, and obtaining data from secondary sources for most control variables (Podsa-
koff et al. 2003). We also included reverse-phrased items which will reduce inform-
ant bias (Field 2005). Lastly, we inspected the results for significant interactions, 
“which are less likely to occur in the presence of single informant bias” (Krishnan 
et al. 2006, p. 903), since informants will normally not “have an ‘interaction-based 
theory’ in their minds to produce” (Li and Zhang 2007, p. 803) such results (Aiken 
and West 1991).
Statistical tests for bias effects included triangulation of survey data using field 
interviews, observing Harman’s (1967) one-factor test, and performing confirmatory 
factor analysis. To provide triangulation with some of the survey results, selected 
informants were interviewed and asked to identify specific traits regarding informal 
personal ties and connections with government actors and the nature of the Philip-
pine regulatory environment (e.g., Luo and Peng 1999). The results exhibited high 
consistency between their verbal reports and their answers on the questionnaire (see 
Sect. 3.1). Harman’s one-factor test is often used to check whether or not common 
method bias is a serious problem in survey data (Krishnan et al. 2006; Podsakoff and 
Organ 1986).
A principal components factor analysis was run on the two survey items that 
were the primary variables of interest, yielding two distinct factors with eigenvalues 
greater than one. Also, no single factor accounted for a majority of the variance. We 
also examined the scree plot, which showed no sign of common method bias (Li 
and Zhang 2007). Lastly, to further substantiate that common method bias is not a 
serious problem and to confirm the dimensionality of the variables of interest in our 
study, a confirmatory factor analysis was performed on all items and all latent vari-
ables (two factor model), as well as on all items and a single latent variable (single 
factor model). There was a significant improvement in change in the Chi square sta-
tistic from the single factor model to the multiple factor model, establishing better 
model fit for the multiple factor model (p < 0.001). Thus, while common method and 
single informant bias is unlikely to be totally mitigated, these procedures have left us 
confident that neither type of bias was a serious problem in our study (Chang et al. 
2010).4
4.2  Tests of Hypotheses
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients among 
all variables in this study. The correlation matrix indicates consistently signifi-
cant relationships between the variables of interest and dependent variables. The 
4 We performed a Breusch-Pagan test in order to check for heteroscedasticity. The results of the test were 
insignificant suggesting that heteroscedasticity is not a serious problem. Further, we observed the P-plots 
for all continuous variables employed in the study and found there to no pattern of abnormal distribution.
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variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all variables were well below 10, indicating 
that multicollinearity is not a serious problem (Hair et al. 1998).
We performed a series of regression analyses in order to test hypotheses 
1 through 4. Table  2 presents these results. The predictive power of the mod-
els were found to be strong with model fit (Model F) and change in variance 
explained (change in  R2) significantly improving from model to model. Model 1 
reports the impact of all control variables on political tie intensity. Cultural dis-
tance (β = 0.15, p < 0.05), market orientation (β = 0.21, p < 0.01), banking and 
finance (β = − 0.14; p < 0.10), and competitive position (β = 0.29, p < 0.01) were 
found to have a significant effect on WOFS political tie intensity. Hypothesis 1 
stated our prediction that WOFS perceptions pf regulator vulnerability to political 
pressure will enhance the development of political tie intensity. The positive and 
significant coefficient (β = 0.51, p < 0.01) on the regulator vulnerability measure 
in Model 2 supports this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 stated our prediction that the positive relationship between political 
tie intensity and WOFS perceptions of regulator vulnerability to political pressure 
will be weaker when political distance is high rather than low. The interaction term 
between regulator vulnerability to political pressure and political distance in Model 
4 was not significant, thereby not supporting hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 stated our 
prediction that the positive relationship between political tie intensity and WOFS 
perceptions of regulator vulnerability to political pressure will be weaker when regu-
latory distance is high rather than low. The significant coefficient (β = 0.12, p < 0.05) 
between political tie intensity and regulator vulnerability in Model 4 supports this 
hypothesis.
To further validate and gain insight into the nature of this moderation effect we 
plotted the interaction where regulatory distance is treated as contingency variable 
affecting the relationship between perceived regulator vulnerability to political pres-
sure and a WOFS’s propensity to intensify political ties (Fig. 1). Corroborating the 
moderated hierarchical regression results, the slopes of the regression lines vary sig-
nificantly (grow positively or negatively steeper) and reflect the change in regula-
tory distance values from low (mean − one standard deviation) to high (mean + one 
standard deviation) (Aiken and West 1991). Therefore, the positive effect of per-
ceived regulator vulnerability to political pressure on WOFS intensification of polit-
ical ties becomes weaker when regulatory distance is high rather than low.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that simultaneous presence of political distance and regu-
latory distance will have mutually reinforcing effects in further diminishing the posi-
tive relationship between perceived regulator vulnerability to political pressures and 
a WOFS’s intensification of political ties. Partial empirical support for this hypoth-
esis can be seen in Model 5 of Table  2. When the three-way interaction between 
political distance, regulatory distance, and regulatory vulnerability was intro-
duced in Model 5, the interaction term was significant at the 0.10 level (β = − 0.11, 
p < 0.10) and explained significant variance over the previous models (change in  R2, 
p < 0.10; change in F, p < 0.10).
We plotted the three-way interaction in order to better understand and explain 
the three-way interaction results in Model 5 (see Fig. 2). Values of political distance 
and regulatory distance were set from low (mean − one standard deviation) to high 
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Fig. 1  Regulatory distance moderates the relationship between perceived regulator vulnerability to polit-
ical pressures and WOFS intensification of political ties
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Fig. 2  Interaction between perceived regulator vulnerability to political pressures, regulatory distance, 
and political distance on WOFS intensification of political ties
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(mean + one standard deviation) (Aiken and West 1991). As shown in Fig.  2, the 
nature of the interaction indicates that when political distance and regulatory dis-
tance are both high, the relationship between perceived regulator vulnerability to 
political pressures and WOFS intensification of political ties will decrease. On the 
other hand, when political distance and regulatory distance are both low, the higher 
manager perceptions of regulator vulnerability to political pressure, the more likely 
a WOFS will enhance the intensification of political ties. Thus, this figure further 
supports our theoretical argument leading to hypothesis 4.
5  Discussion and Conclusions
Our study attempts to answer (1) Doh et al.’s (2012) and Lux et al.’s (2011) calls for 
greater application of institutional theory in CPA literature by investigating the ante-
cedents of firm governance, and (2) Mellahi et al.’s (2016) call for applying primary 
data to extend current theoretical perspectives by investigating how managerial cog-
nition influences variation in strategic decision making within the nonmarket arena. 
Building on these calls, our study theoretically and empirically extends the current 
state of the CPA literature by employing the institution-based view (Peng 2002) and 
neo-institutional theory (Scott 1995) to investigate the direct effect of managerial 
perceptions as they relate to regulator vulnerabilities to political pressures and gov-
ernment interference in the governing of WOFSs. We therefore contribute to the 
CPA literature by finding that managerial perceptions of regulator vulnerability to 
political pressures do directly influence WOFS intensification of political ties with 
key government actors. We have discovered that intensifying political ties with key 
government actors provides nonmarket opportunities for the WOFS by strategically 
engaging in the regulatory oversight process in an attempt to shape favorable regula-
tory policies (see generally Bonardi et al. 2005; Oliver and Holzinger 2008). This 
is a very important finding in that our study is the first to indicate how senior man-
agers perceive political pressures placed on regulators will directly influence their 
WOFS’s propensity to intensify political ties with key government actors.
From a contingency perspective, we found that regulatory distance, but not politi-
cal distance, moderated the relationship between perceived regulator vulnerability 
to political pressure and WOFS development of political ties. This is a very impor-
tant finding establishes that there is significant variation in how different forms of 
formal institutional distance influences the ‘sticky’ relationship between manage-
rial perceptions of political pressures placed on government regulators and a foreign 
subsidiary’s intensification of political ties with government actors. In other words, 
differences in home and host country regulatory, but not political, institutions play a 
significant role in this evaluative strategic process. Subsequently, we also found that 
the simultaneous presence of political and regulatory distance between a WOFS’s 
home and host country further diminished the positive relationship between per-
ceived regulator vulnerability to political pressure and the propensity for a WOFS 
to intensify political ties. Moreover, these findings extend the CPA literature by 
shedding light on how the interaction between managerial perceptions concerning 
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host country regulatory institutions, and distance between a WOFS’s home and host 
country institutional environment, effect a WOFS’s intensification of political ties.
Our study helps managers to better understand how political ties can be used 
where current logic discounts reasons for the intensification of political ties. In gen-
eral, our paper contributes to management practices as how to make decisions on 
nonmarket strategies to enhance a firm’s position and influence in obtaining WOFS’s 
opportunities with key government actors by reducing perceived regulator vulner-
ability to political pressure. It is our contention that enhanced intensity of political 
ties with key government actors will serve to create opportunities for the WOFS 
to proactively shape how the foreign subsidiary is regulated (Bonardi 1999; Kings-
ley et al. 2012). However, managers should be mindful of the fact that political and 
regulatory differences between their home and host countries will have an impact on 
their foreign subsidiary’s nonmarket strategic decision-making and planning; as a 
WOFS’s propensity and capability of leveraging political ties may be determined by 
managerial perceptiveness.
Our findings also lend to the discussion concerning managerial implications asso-
ciated with the dynamics and contested value of political embeddedness in emerg-
ing markets (e.g., Siegel 2007; Sun et al. 2010, 2012). Managers should be cogni-
zant that investing resources in and leveraging political ties with regulators (who 
are perceived to be vulnerable to political pressures) may result in declining or even 
negative outcomes over a long-term time horizon (see generally Sun et  al. 2010). 
For example, positive outcomes associated with the leveraging of embedded rela-
tionships with government regulators through the intensification of political ties 
may quickly change to a liability due to government regime change which may lead 
to negative discriminatory government practices (Dieleman and Boddewyn 2012; 
Siegel 2007). However, identifying and determining the nature of outcomes associ-
ated with the intensification of political ties and the value of political embeddedness 
is firm specific and largely based on the strategic goals established by a MNE within 
a host counties nonmarket arena. Our study alludes to the notion that differences in 
a foreign subsidiaries home and host country regulatory and political environments 
may attenuate managerial assessment of these temporal outcomes.
This paper has a few limitations that point to potential new directions in future 
research. First, the data employed in this study is almost a decade old and is based on 
survey responses from single key informants. The use of single key informant data 
may pose potential problems such as the limited recall of informants, biased percep-
tions of past actualities, and common method issues. However, we consider these 
key informants to be highly knowledgeable about their WOFSs’ operations and rep-
resent a reliable source for information. More research is needed to investigate how 
the ‘sticky’ relationship between managerial perceptions of regulative institutions 
influences foreign subsidiary nonmarket strategy formulation (see generally White 
et al. 2015). For example, how will these relationships influence the choice between 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ government actors as targets in cultivating and intensifying politi-
cal ties? Also, how will these choices impact strategic performance outcomes of 
foreign subsidiaries intensifying such political ties? From a qualitative perspective, 
how will the presence of an in-house government affairs manager or consultation 
with external advisers influence top management perceptions concerning regulator 
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vulnerabilities to political pressure? Also, our study focused on the moderating 
effects of regulative forms of institutional distance (i.e., political and regulatory dis-
tance). Thus, future research could build from our study in delving deeper into how 
other form of institutional distance influences these relationships.
Second, we have also endeavored to extend the CPA literature by investigat-
ing how managerial perceptions influence the intensification, rather than extent, of 
political ties as WOFS nonmarket strategies. However, the primary variable and 
dependent variables of interest in this study were subjective measures. The choice of 
using perceptual measures was driven by the problematic nature of obtaining objec-
tive data in the Philippines. While efforts to obtain objective data on WOFSs were 
unsuccessful, the use of perceptual measures is consistent with foreign subsidiary 
literature in other country contexts (Acquaah 2007; Krishnan et  al. 2006; Li and 
Zhang 2007). This perspective is also consistent with calls in the international man-
agement literature to more closely investigate how and why managerial perceptions 
of the institutional environment influence strategic behavior of firms (Mellahi et al. 
2016; Peng 2002; Peng et  al. 2009; White et  al. 2015). With this mind, we con-
sider our study to be novel to the CPA literature by employing a measure exploring 
managerial perceptions concerning the nature of government intervention relating to 
political pressure placed on civil service officers regulating foreign subsidiary oper-
ations in host country environments. Further, while outside the scope of this study, 
future research could explore the antecedents concerning how educational back-
ground (i.e., field of specialization; did the manager study abroad?), region where 
originally from within their home country (i.e., most countries exhibit within coun-
try variations across regions concerning institutional development, ethnic make-up, 
and religious backgrounds), as well as international management experience and 
exposure to different forms of regulative institutional environments affect manage-
rial perceptions of regulator vulnerabilities to political pressure.
Third, our dataset is cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, thereby making it 
difficult to gauge the complete causal relationships between perceived regulator 
vulnerabilities to political pressure, political and regulatory distance, and WOFS 
intensification of political ties. For example, would the positive relationship between 
perceived regulator vulnerability to political pressures and the intensification of 
political ties by a WOFS hold over time as the foreign subsidiary gains experience or 
grows in size in the host country where it operates? Interestingly, WOFS experience 
was negatively related to the intensification of political ties and not related to mana-
gerial perceptions of regulator vulnerabilities to political pressures (see Table 2). On 
the other hand, WOFS size was not significantly related to either the intensification 
of political ties nor managerial perceptions of regulator vulnerabilities to political 
pressures in the regression analysis or in the correlation matrix of our study. Fur-
ther, WOFS size became significant at the .10 level only once when the primary 
variable of interest (regulator vulnerability) was added to the analysis in Model 2, 
Table 3. Thus, a natural extension of this study would be to investigate these casual 
relationships from a longitudinal perspective. Also, as previously mentioned, further 
research (both quantitative and qualitative in nature) is needed to investigate explor-
ing potential reasons for variance in declining or negative outcomes associated with 
765
1 3
Regulator Vulnerabilities to Political Pressures and Political…
leveraging political ties over a long-term time horizon. Would these longitudinal 
results hold in other less developed country contexts or contexts crisis zones?
Fourth, the empirical setting of this study was a single country, the Philippines. 
Although using a single country setting helps control for environmental factors, we 
do not know the extent to which the relationship between managerial perceptions 
of regulator vulnerability to political pressures and the intensification of political 
ties by a WOFS is context-specific. We argue that our results extend prior research 
and are generalizable across multiple country settings, particularly to other under-
explored country contexts such as Southeast Asia and Africa, and provide greater 
insight into the drivers and outcomes associated with the intensification of political 
ties by foreign subsidiaries (i.e., as they relate to managerial perceptions of regulator 
vulnerability to political pressures). In conclusion, we hope that future research can 
build on our study by further exploring how the interaction between various forms 
of institutional distance and managerial perceptions of government actors regulating 
foreign subsidiary business practices play a role in influencing nonmarket strategic 
decision-making.
Appendix: Political distance moderates the relationship 
between regulatory distance and WOFS development of political ties
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